ulsklyc/yuvomi v2.25.1

on GitHub

Security

• The MCP endpoint now enforces the same module permissions as the REST API (#823). A member
  configured with a module set to "no access" was refused by /api/v1 but still served by the
  matching MCP tool: list_tasks returned the household's tasks for an account whose Tasks module
  was none, and the write tools were open the same way. The reason was structural rather than a
  missed check - the curated core tools run in-process against SQLite and never pass through the
  Express middleware where the permission rule was spelled out, so nothing was there to apply it.
  The rule now lives in one place (moduleAccessVerdict in server/permissions.js) that both
  surfaces call: a module on none refuses the read and the write tool, a module on read refuses
  only the write tool, and tools/list hides what the account may not call, so an AI client is
  never offered a tool its next request would deny. Token scopes and member permissions are two
  independent limits and both have to agree - handing out a token can no longer widen what the
  person behind it is allowed to do. Guest accounts for Shared expenses, which /api/v1 confines to
  the expense routes, likewise reach no core tool any more. The OpenAPI bridge was never affected:
  it loops back through the REST layer and inherited every limit already. Self-hosters who kept the
  MCP port away from ordinary accounts for this reason no longer need to.