Security fixes for the node and the coordinator.
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The node /stream WebSocket now requires the node token, the same as /query and /exec, and refuses handshakes that carry a browser Origin header. Before, anyone who could reach the node port could read the live HEP/SIP stream. The coordinator sends the token when it dials.
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The coordinator request log masks access_token and other credential parameters (id_token, refresh_token, token, api_key, password, OAuth code/state) as REDACTED. Before, every ?access_token= request put a usable bearer token into stdout and docker logs.
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The SQL validator blocks query(), query_table() and json_execute_serialized_sql(), in raw SQL and in filter expressions. They ran their string argument as SQL, so a blocked reader inside them was accepted.
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The node query DuckDB runs sandboxed: after extensions, secrets and volumes are set up, autoinstall/autoload and community extensions are off, only volume paths, stored DATA_PATHs, catalog files and the spill directory are allowed, and enable_external_access = false. SQL cannot turn this back on. On by default; node.duckdb_sandbox: false (HOMER_NODE_DUCKDB_SANDBOX) opts out. In all-in-one mode, queries on the writer and tiering DuckDBs are not sandboxed yet; the SQL validator still applies.
What's Changed
- fix(security): node /stream auth, token redaction in logs, block query() in SQL validator by @adubovikov in #1132
- feat(security): sandbox the node query DuckDB by @adubovikov in #1131
- chore: bump version to 11.0.382 by @adubovikov in #1133
Full Changelog: 11.0.381...11.0.382