This release adds configurable allow paths to secret protection and fixes several cases where the secret path scanner misread commands, including a detection gap for symlinked credential directories.
Added
- Added a
secret_protection.allow_pathspolicy setting with a matching "Allow paths" list in the policy GUI. Literal file or directory entries are exempt from the secret pattern rules; explicit deny paths and the coding-CLI protections still apply. Entries that cover the home directory or the guard's own configuration are rejected, and glob patterns are not supported. (#77)
Fixed
- Fixed the home credential rules (
~/.ssh,~/.aws, ...) so they still block access when the credential directory is a symlink, as commonly created by dotfile and password managers. (#77) - Fixed false blocks on text that does not name a local file: regex operands such as
git grep "process\.env", prose that begins with a sensitive prefix such as.env.example), and remotehttp(s)URLs. Files that exist on disk with such names,file:URLs, and shell-escaped operands stay blocked. (#77) - Fixed the
explainexemption to cover every documented invocation form, includingbunx cc-safety-net explain,npx -y cc-safety-net explain, andbun run <entrypoint> explain. Other runners and packages keep full argument inspection. (#77) - Fixed the policy GUI so an unsaved draft created before this release restores without breaking the editor. (#77)