dtzp555-max/ocp v3.17.1

on GitHub

v3.17.1 — 2026-05-31

Fix — code-audit P1/P2 hardening

Fixes from a multi-agent code audit (3 P1 + 5 P2, adversarially verified). The single-user default path (AUTH_MODE=none, no TUI) is behavior-identical.

Availability / correctness (P1):

• Guard proc.stdin against EPIPE — a fast-failing spawned claude (auth error, bad model, large prompt) no longer crashes the single-process daemon.
• Add unhandledRejection/uncaughtException/clientError safety nets + wrap all request-body read loops — a client aborting mid-upload no longer crashes the daemon.
• TUI transcript reader: only turn_duration is terminal (was also tool_use), which silently truncated any TUI turn that used a built-in tool.

Security gates / cache integrity (P2):

• AUTH_MODE=multi: the default spawn now passes --disallowedTools (Bash/Read/Write/Edit/…) so a guest prompt cannot drive operator-filesystem tools. Single-user path unchanged.
• /sessions (DELETE), /settings (PATCH), /logs, /usage, /status are now admin-gated (were dispatched before the admin check).
• Streaming path no longer caches an is_error response as success (cache-poisoning fix).
• TUI fail-loud guard extended to none+0.0.0.0 (unless OCP_TUI_ALLOW_LAN=1) and + PROXY_ANONYMOUS_KEY.
• TUI send-keys paste uses -l (literal) so a prompt equal to a tmux key token (e.g. C-c) is typed, not interpreted.