v3.5.0
Two opt-in additions: a per-run record of every filtered-egress decision, and
native macOS clipboard access without the broad host IPC grant.
Backward compatible: both are off by default, neither changes an existing
launch, and no saved profile is affected.
Added
-
--egress-log <PATH>records what the filtered-egress proxy decided
(#228 PR 1, #240). One JSON line per accepted connection — allowed,
refused, or failed — with a line version, UTC end time, a per-launch run id,
the requested host and port, the verdict and a fixed reason, byte counts and
duration. A terminated--secretrequest adds the upstream host and port
the proxy itself dialed. CLI-only,Operational, Linux only, and refused
when the network is off or full, where there is no proxy to observe. The
file is opened by the supervisor withO_NOFOLLOW | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, mode
0600, close-on-exec, and a symlink, a non-regular file, another user's file
or a missing directory refuses the launch before the command runs. Once
writing, it never stops the traffic: a write failure warns once. Lines are
printable ASCII with control and non-ASCII characters escaped, concurrent
appends are serialised, and a torn earlier write is fenced so no record can
swallow the next one. No request content is ever recorded — no path, query,
method, header, body, credential, or--secretkey name, placeholder or
value — and CONNECT tunnels stay opaque. When the command exits, connections
it left open are shut and their lines awaited for up to two seconds, with a
warning naming the count of any still open. Thanks @lucascouts. -
--macos-pasteboardgives native clipboard access without broad host IPC
(#241). Off by default and dropped under--lockdown, it permits exactly
onemach-lookupofcom.apple.pasteboard.1, so a jailed process can copy
and paste text and images without--macos-host-ipc. An untrusted project
policy cannot enable it, a reviewed disabled choice persists as a
constraint, and the capability appears in the Additional screen, the CLI
preview, the effective-access review,status, and the saved-policy
authority checks. Clipboard contents are host data: the jail can read copied
passwords and tokens and replace what you paste elsewhere, and the review
says so. No effect on Linux. Thanks @pietro1704.
Fixed
- A trusted SSH tool that is busy at exec is retried. The known_hosts
lookup executed a just-written fixture with no retry and could fail with
Text file busy(ETXTBSY) when another thread's fork still held the file
open; it now shares the ssh-add probe's bounded retry, with a test for each
site. - The path-pruning test no longer depends on
TMPDIR. Another test parks
TMPDIRat a missing path while it holds the environment lock, so the
pruning test could read a vanished fixture directory. It uses a fixed
existing directory now.
Notes
- New coverage:
tests/run_observability.rsdrives the real binary for the
line shape, append across runs, filtered-only refusal, unopenable targets,
and macOS refusal; unit tests cover field escaping, torn writes, warn-once,
and the secret-termination line without secrets. The pasteboard grant has
profile-text tests for default, opt-in, lockdown, project-policy refusal,
and an ignored macOS runtime check. - README,
docs/SECURITY.md,docs/USER_GUIDE.md, and
docs/CLI_TUI_PARITY.mddocument both additions.
See the security model for what each grant exposes.
Checksums (SHA256)
5678805c3cb809220f7ee3015f6b58ae3d4e57aab6abe58e57afec93fdf3d7d5 ai-jail-linux-x86_64.tar.gz
f8d1d464922e89a9990b9fddd16c6cb2068c6da7ade1f9ba7af7730d02108af1 ai-jail-macos-aarch64.tar.gz
66b8d789a109d72b7ee6762f039bad0f359f8d7e723fc58928be275ad9c9f3be ai-jail_3.5.0_amd64.deb
Install
brew tap akitaonrails/tap && brew install ai-jail
yay -S ai-jail-bin
cargo install --locked ai-jail
# Debian/Ubuntu: download the .deb below, then
sudo apt install ./ai-jail_*_amd64.deb