ZcashFoundation/zebra v4.5.0

Zebra 4.5.0

on GitHub

This release fixes several critical security issues. We recommend node operators update to
4.5.0 as soon as possible.

The release also adds support for mining to a shielded address.

Security

• Remove rejected block hashes from SentHashes so honest re-deliveries are
  not short-circuited as duplicates
  (GHSA-4m69-67m6-prqp).
  Thanks to @ipwning and @x15-eth for reporting the issue.
• Cap the upfront Vec::with_capacity reservation in
  zcash_deserialize_external_count so a peer-supplied CompactSize
  cannot force a large allocation before any element bytes are read. The
  Vec grows naturally via push() as real data arrives. Complements
  the per-type max_allocation() caps from PR #10494
  (GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8,
  #10563). CWE-770.
• Cap block::Hash::max_allocation at MAX_BLOCK_LOCATOR_LENGTH = 101
  (matching Bitcoin Core's MAX_LOCATOR_SZ in net_processing.cpp) and
  CountedHeader::max_allocation at the existing
  MAX_HEADERS_PER_MESSAGE = 160 constant (already enforced on the
  sending side and at the codec level for read_headers). The previous
  values were derived from MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN and returned 65,535
  and ~1,409 respectively, allowing a post-handshake peer to force ~2 MiB
  of upfront Vec preallocation per getblocks/getheaders message
  before any payload bytes were read. Same fix shape as
  GHSA-xr93-pcq3-pxf8 for AddrV1/AddrV2 (PR #10494)
  (#10570). CWE-770.
• Reject non-ASCII longpollid values in the getblocktemplate RPC
  (GHSA-qv2r-v3mx-f4pf).
  Thanks to @sangsoo-osec for reporting the issue.
• Return error for malformed Sapling receiver in z_listunifiedreceivers RPC
  (GHSA-c8w6-x74f-vmg3).
  Thanks to @robustfengbin for reporting the issue.
• Prevent sync restart from poisoning the peer inventory registry, and score
  peers that send consensus-invalid blocks
  (GHSA-gvjc-3w7c-92jx,
  GHSA-rj6c-83wx-jxf2,
  GHSA-hwxr-r2v4-9f2p).
  Thanks to @ipwning and @sangsoo-osec for reporting the issues.
• Avoid panic in address-balance computation on same-address self-spend chains
  by applying transparent debits before credits per transaction
  (GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w).
  Thanks to @sangsoo-osec for reporting the issue.
• Reject repeated shielded transactions cleanly before the defence-in-depth
  tx_loc_by_hash assertion, avoiding a panic
  (GHSA-hhm7-qrv5-h4r6).
  Thanks to @Haxatron for reporting the issue.
• Cap pre-handshake message body length in Codec to 1 KB; the cap is raised
  to MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LEN after handshake completion
  (GHSA-h72h-ppcx-998p).
  Thanks to @ouicate for reporting the issue.
• Fix sigop undercount in P2SH inputs by routing through the
  legacy_sigop_count_script FFI to match zcashd's
  CScript::GetSigOpCount(true) exactly, preventing a consensus split on
  attacker-chosen redeem scripts
  (GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx).
  Thanks to @samsulselfut for reporting the issue.
• Cap the inbound mempool download queue per advertising peer so a single
  peer cannot monopolize verification capacity
  (GHSA-4fc2-h7jh-287c).
  Thanks to @dingledropper for reporting the issue.
• Canonicalize IPv4-mapped addresses on the misbehavior path so a peer cannot
  evade scoring by alternating between IPv4 and IPv4-mapped-IPv6 forms of the
  same address
  (GHSA-63wg-wjjj-7cp8).
  Thanks to @Haxatron for reporting the issue.
• Drain the mempool downloader's cancel_handles entry when the outer
  verification timeout fires, so the queued Gossip::Tx(UnminedTx) is not
  retained until the process runs out of memory. Without the fix, a single peer
  that gets each pushed transaction to hit RATE_LIMIT_DELAY could leak up to
  ~2 MB per transaction monotonically
  (GHSA-65jj-fmw8-468q).
  Thanks to @AnticsDecoded for reporting the issue.
• Pop Sapling/Orchard subtrees when popping non-finalized tip
  (GHSA-2gf8-q9rr-jq3h).
  Thanks to @dingledropper for reporting the issue.

Added

• Startup warning on Linux when net.ipv4.tcp_slow_start_after_idle is enabled (which resets TCP congestion windows between block requests and significantly reduces single-peer block-propagation throughput on long-haul links), with a "Linux TCP tuning for block propagation" troubleshooting section (#10513)
• Support for ZIP-213 (Shielded Coinbase) (#10048)

Changed

• Renamed testnet_parameters in the network config; use [network.params]
  instead (#10051). The
  old format is still accepted.

Fixed

• Avoid panicking in the address-book ban path when network.max_connections_per_ip > 1. Guard the optional most_recent_by_ip cache instead of unwrapping it, so a ban-threshold misbehavior update no longer crashes the address-book updater and poisons the shared mutex (#10589)
• Propagate transaction-level value-balance errors from Block::chain_value_pool_change() instead of silently dropping them. The previous flat_map(Result) aggregation relied on Result<T, E>: IntoIterator and yielded zero items on Err, so a failing transaction was omitted from the block sum rather than surfacing as a ValueBalanceError (#10590)
• Solve Rust 1.97 beta clippy lints (#10644)

Contributors

Thank you to everyone who contributed to this release, we couldn't make Zebra without you:
@ValarDragon, @andres-pcg, @conradoplg, @dingledropper, @evan-forbes, @gustavovalverde, @oxarbitrage, @syszery, @upbqdn, @zmanian.