NeySlim/ultimate-ca-manager v2.201-rc1

on GitHub

[2.200] - 2026-07-21

Added

• ACME client protocol coverage — upstream certificate revocation through the proxy (previously answered 501), ARI consumption (RFC 9773: suggested renewal windows and the replaces field on renewal orders), TLS-ALPN-01 challenge support (RFC 8737) and IP identifiers (RFC 8738).
• ACME server conformance (RFC 8555) — registered error types (badNonce, badRevocationReason, caa…), full order/authorization state machine (processing, expired, authorization failures propagate to the order), subproblem documents (§6.7.1), contact validation (unsupportedContact/invalidContact), error field exposed on orders, EAB protected.url verification, application/jose+json content type, ARI replaces tracking (migration 063).
• SCEP (RFC 8894) — GetCert and GetCRL operations, mandatory 16-byte senderNonce, intermediate chain in GetCACert (degenerate PKCS#7), signingTime validation, signed GetNextCACert, AES-128-CBC encryption, PasswordRecipientInfo with PBKDF2 for non-RSA clients, strict SignerInfo/RecipientInfo/eContentType validation.
• OCSP (RFC 6960) — multi-certificate requests (§4.1.1), unknown critical request extensions answered with malformedRequest, delegated responder validation (issued by the CA, within validity, OCSPSigning EKU), configurable response validity window.
• CAA (RFC 8657/8659) — accounturi and validationmethods parameters enforced during ACME issuance, fail-closed on critical flags and on DNS failures (SERVFAIL/timeout), iodef reports logged.
• EST (RFC 7030) — strict application/pkcs10 content type, certs-only responses (smime-type=certs-only), subject+SAN comparison on re-enroll, unauthenticated /csrattrs, spec-conformant server-side key generation (CMS EnvelopedData §4.4).
• TSA (RFC 3161) — reqPolicy validation (unacceptedPolicy on mismatch), signer EKU timeStamping verification, hash algorithm aligned with the message imprint, per-token audit.
• Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962) — pre-certificate submission flow (add-pre-chain) with the SCT list embedded as an X.509 extension in the issued certificate (opt-in ct_embed_sct, with ct_required enforcement).
• Misc protocol hardening — syslog RFC 6587 octet-counting framing with TLS verify option, WebAuthn authenticator clone detection (signature counter), SSH CA allowed-principals patterns (fnmatch) with CA/cert type checks, Kerberos PKINIT EKU in the EKU catalog, RFC 4514 LDAP DN parsing.

Security

• OCSP cache invalidated on revocation — revoking a certificate now purges every cached OCSP response for it (per-algorithm cache entries were missed), so revoked certificates stop being reported good immediately (RFC 6960 §2.2). Nonced responses are no longer cached, and lookups are scoped to the issuing CA to prevent cross-CA serial collisions.
• ACME POST-as-GET enforced — orders, authorizations and certificates now require a signed JWS request; they were previously readable without authentication (renewalInfo stays public per RFC 9773).
• OIDC SSO id_token verification — signature, issuer, audience, expiry and nonce are now validated against the provider's JWKS (discovery with key caching, fail-closed; migration 062). Upgrade note: verification defaults to on; existing OIDC providers must have their issuer (and JWKS URI, or a discoverable issuer) configured in Settings → SSO, otherwise OIDC logins fail closed with "OIDC issuer is not configured" until set. Verification can be turned off per provider if needed.
• Name constraints enforced on every issuance path — the subject and SANs are validated against the NameConstraints of the whole CA chain (not just the direct issuer) on web, ACME, EST, SCEP, renewal and approval-policy issuance; unauthorized CSR extensions are filtered from issued certificates.
• Delegated-authority EKUs restricted for protocol enrollees — certificates issued from a CSR via ACME/EST/SCEP can no longer carry id-kp-OCSPSigning or id-kp-timeStamping, which would otherwise let a domain-validated client mint an OCSP delegated responder for the whole CA.
• SCEP GetNextCACert response is now signed as required by RFC 8894.
• Certificate Transparency policy applied on all issuance paths — SCT embedding and the ct_required gate now apply to ACME- and EST-issued certificates, not only the web issuance path.

Fixed

• ACME pre-authorization (RFC 8555 §7.4.1) crashed when validating a challenge on an authorization not bound to an order.
• ACME wildcard orders kept the *. prefix in the authorization identifier and omitted the wildcard: true flag.
• CRL scheduler used delta CRL metadata to decide full-CRL regeneration timing.
• Microsoft AD CS: admin channel test now uses the form's unsaved values — changing e.g. the WinRM transport no longer requires saving before testing, and a test never persists anything.
• Microsoft AD CS: inventory sync no longer duplicates certificates signed through UCM — deduplication matches the CA's RequestId and compares serial numbers under both byte orders (certutil reports serials with reversed byte pairs).
• Microsoft AD CS: imported certificates can now be renewed — when the original CSR/key is not in UCM, renewal generates a fresh key pair and a CSR with the same subject and SANs (rekey) and submits it to the issuing connection; a "No Key" badge on the certificate detail makes key-less imports explicit.
• SSH host CA setup script printed an API signing example with a nonexistent endpoint and the CA name where its id belongs.

[2.199] - 2026-07-20

Added

• ACME proxy advertises Renewal Information (ARI, RFC 9773) — the proxy directory now exposes a renewalInfo endpoint served locally from the stored certificate, so ACME clients can schedule renewals of proxy-issued certificates. Imported certificates now populate AKI/SKI and serial number so their ARI certID resolves.
• Configurable trust store sync limit — the maximum number of certificates fetched per sync is now adjustable from the Trust Store page instead of being hardcoded.

Changed

• Generic external-CA metadata for ACME proxy certificates — certificates issued through the ACME proxy are stored with source acme_client and labelled with the external account name (e.g. Actalis, ZeroSSL) instead of the hardcoded "Let's Encrypt" identity. Proxy orders are pinned to their external CA account, and the ACME history view shows the account label with a new acme_client source filter.

Security

• ACME EAB HMAC keys encrypted at rest — external account EAB secrets (acme_client_accounts.eab_hmac_key and the legacy acme.client/acme.proxy SystemConfig values) are now encrypted with the master key on write, transparently decrypted on read, and rewritten by migration 061 where encryption is enabled. Legacy plaintext values remain readable.

Full history: CHANGELOG.md