Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard v0.12.5

on GitHub

Security and hardening release — five fixed fail-opens since v0.12.4.

Security

• Shell long options no longer hide a piped or process-substituted payload.
  A shell consumer carrying an unrecognized no-value long option
  (bash --norc, --posix, --login, --noprofile, and sh equivalents)
  was read as if the option were a script-file operand, so
  echo 'rm -rf ~' | bash --norc and bash --norc <(echo 'rm -rf ~') were
  allowed. The shell still reads its program from stdin / the substitution,
  so the payload is now scanned. Value-taking (--rcfile, --init-file) and
  terminal (--, --help, --version, --command) long options are
  classified precisely.
• --rcfile / --init-file process substitutions are treated as executing
  sinks. An interactive shell sources its init file at startup, and that file
  may be a process substitution: bash --init-file <(…) -i runs the
  substitution's output (verified on macOS and Linux). The marker was swallowed
  as an inert option value, allowing the payload; it is now evaluated as the
  shell's source. -o / -O still consume their set-option / shopt name
  (which bash rejects rather than executes).

Fixed

• Rebase-recovery no longer unlocks a git command against the wrong
  repository. The recovery-mode working-directory resolver now fails closed
  when a cd cannot reach the git segment through a subshell separator
  (cd repo & git restore, cd repo | git restore), when
  git-repo-redirecting environment assignments (GIT_DIR=, GIT_WORK_TREE=, …)
  re-point git, and on pushd -n / bare pushd.
• Denials name the allow-once remedy. permissionDecisionReason now states
  the scoped dcg allow-once <code> command for harnesses that surface only the
  reason string, and the operator banner lists it above dcg allowlist add
  (#332).

Added

• New database.databricks pack guarding destructive Databricks CLI
  operations (executable-scoped), included in the careful_company preset
  (#333).

Every archive is signed with minisign and cosign and carries SLSA provenance.
Verify with the bundled install.sh / install.ps1, or against the published
SHA256SUMS and its signatures.