Warning

Upgrade notes: behavioral changes, please read before updating. Three security-hardening fixes that change runtime behavior first shipped in 1.4.6 and carry through the entire 1.5 line. Anyone updating from a release older than 1.4.6 is affected, whatever version you land on (1.4.6, any 1.5.x, or later), because these changes sit across the 1.4.6 boundary rather than in one specific version. These are not deprecations: there is no compatibility shim or grace period, so a previously-working deployment can change behavior on upgrade.

1. OIDC login now requires authorization_endpoint in your provider's discovery metadata. The authorization-redirect allowlist no longer falls back to a broad same-origin match. Mainstream identity providers (Keycloak, Authentik, Authelia, Okta, Google, Entra/Azure AD, Zitadel, …) publish this field and are unaffected. If your /.well-known/openid-configuration does not advertise authorization_endpoint, OIDC sign-in will now fail closed — make sure the discovery document exposes it.
2. Unauthenticated rate-limit buckets now key on the TCP peer address instead of X-Forwarded-For. Behind a reverse proxy (nginx / Traefik / Caddy), all unauthenticated clients now share a single bucket (the proxy's address), regardless of DD_SERVER_TRUSTPROXY. Internet-facing or multi-user instances may begin to see unexpected 429 Too Many Requests on unauthenticated endpoints. Authenticated requests are keyed per session and are unaffected.
3. HTTP-trigger proxy URLs must now use the http:// or https:// scheme. Any other scheme (e.g. socks5://) is rejected at config load. Such values were previously accepted but only ever treated as an HTTP proxy — switch to an http(s):// proxy URL.