Changes from 3.3.2 to 3.3.3

This is a bugfix and security release fixing bounds checking issues in BloscLZ.

• Fixed integer and pointer overflow in BloscLZ decompression bounds checks.
  In blosclz_decompress, match length accumulation in the length-extension
  loop (while (code == 255)) was unbounded, allowing crafted chunks to grow
  len arbitrarily large.

  On 32-bit platforms (and WebAssembly wasm32), pointer arithmetic op + len
  wrapped modulo 2^32 when destination buffers were allocated high in the
  virtual address space, bypassing the op + len > op_limit guard and leading
  to out-of-bounds heap writes. On 64-bit platforms, an excessively large input
  could similarly trigger signed int32_t overflow.

  This has been resolved by:

  • Capping match length accumulation inside the extension loop early with
    if (len > maxout) return 0;.
  • Converting all pointer-addition bounds checks (op + len > op_limit, literal
    copy checks, and compressor macros) into safe subtraction form
    (len > op_limit - op).
  • Adding a regression test in tests/test_blosclz_bounds.c.

  Thanks to Lylan from QI-ANXIN Technology Research Institute for discovering
  and reporting this vulnerability.

There are no API or format changes in this release.