Security: three faults reported against 0.34.
- CVE-2026-129847: a line in the header section that is not a
header field (no colon; white space or nothing before the
colon; a fold before the colon, which RFC 5322 does not allow
and 0.34 read as a field; a first line starting with white
space) was dropped unread, so it was in no header hash: such
lines could be added to a signed message without breaking any
Message-Instance, while other parsers read them (Python's email
ends the header section at one). The Verifier now gives
"PERMERROR: malformed header field" for a message with any
DKIM2 field, before every other check, and the Signer refuses
("malformed header field"). A message with no DKIM2 field is
still none. New HeaderParser method malformed_header. Since
0.22.
- CVE-2026-129848: the tag-list parser trimmed a value's trailing
white space with a pattern quadratic in a run of white space
inside the value: a DKIM2-Signature or Message-Instance field
of about 1MB took minutes, before any authentication. Linear
now; what is accepted is unchanged. Since 0.20.
- CVE-2026-129849: Mail::DKIM2::Validate::report walked the chain
level by level even when the Verifier had refused it for having
more than 32 Message-Instance or DKIM2-Signature fields, parsing
the whole message again at every level: one request to the
validator could cost minutes. Over the limit it now reports the
Verifier's PERMERROR and no levels; it reads i= and m= only as
chain numbers (1 to 99). Since 0.18.